Late 18th-century and 19th-century political theorists viewed democracy as incompatible with the security of private property necessary for investment and economic growth to occur.
Their intuition can easily be phrased in terms familiar to modern-day theorists of political economy. With a rightward-skewed distribution of income and wealth, the median income in society will fall short of the mean income. Under majority-rule voting on redistributional issues, the median-income voter will have an incentive to ally with the poorer half of voters to transfer income and wealth from the richer half.
In Federalist #10, Madison argued that "...the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society." In the absence of sufficient checks and balances on popular majorities, "...democracies...have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths." In a letter to Jefferson, John Adams predicted that "Democracy will envy all, contend with all, endeavor to pull down all..." Similarly, universal suffrage was deemed to be incompatible with property rights by David Ricardo, J.S. Mill, Thomas Macaulay, Karl Marx, and Daniel Webster, among others.
Modern-day theorists have formalized such thinking in models of political redistribution in democracies. For example, Meltzer and Richard (1981) develop a model in which the income tax rate chosen by the median voter is higher when income inequality is higher. Persson and Tabellini (1994) add this political redistribution mechanism to an overlapping generations model with an intertemporal externality permitting endogenous growth, generating the prediction that investment and growth are decreasing functions of inequality in democracies. For nondemocracies, they argue, the predicted relationship between inequality on the one hand, and investment and growth in the other, is ambiguous. The median voter is not decisive in those polities, as decisions are not made through majority-rule voting. The redistributive policy favored by the decisive individual or group, they claim, may have very little to do with the distribution of income and wealth in nondemocracies.
Persson and Tabellini test their hypotheses using cross-national data. They find, as predicted, a negative relationship between government transfers as a proportion of GDP (averaged over 1960-81) and the share of national income accruing to the middle quintile of income earners (as measured circa 1960). With only 13 observations, this relationship is not statistically significant, however.
1 They similarly find a negative but insignificant effect of transfers on growth.
Given this weak evidence on the direct links between inequality and transfers, and between transfers and growth, Persson and Tabellini turn to indirect tests examining the impact of inequality on economic performance. Using time-series cross-sectional data for nine developed nations going back to 1830, they find inequality is significantly associated with lower growth rates. They report, however, that the strength of inequality's dampening effect on growth does not increase with the enfranchised proportion of the electorate --as one would expect if democracy impairs growth through politically-driven redistribution. Additionally, they report that when time dummies are added, inequality no longer is significantly associated with growth.
In other words, at a given point in time, there is little cross-country correlation between the two variables.
Empirical Tabellini nondemocracy findings sufficiently closely that the trivial remaining differences could be attributed to rounding.
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Two simple checks on these Persson and Tabellini results strongly suggest that the differential impact of inequality on growth in democracies and nondemocracies is entirely an artifact of measurement error. I conclude that the hypothesis that inequality harms growth as much in nondemocracies as in democracies cannot be rejected.
The first correction for measurement error deletes the seven observations --all autocracies --on inequality that Paukert (1973, p. 125) , the sole source of inequality data for
Persson and Tabellini, warns are of "rather doubtful value." 6 If autocracies tend to be poor, and poverty and closed political systems generate less reliable data, we are less likely to detect a "true" relationship between inequality and growth among nondemocracies than among democracies. The fact the seven observations Paukert questions are all autocracies is consistent with this conjecture.
Deleting these seven suspect observations in fact increases the coefficient on MIDDLE somewhat for the autocracies (Table 1, equation 3) . Given the resulting small sample size, a more informative test employs the combined sample of democracies and autocracies, in which inequality is interacted with a democracy dummy. The coefficient on this interaction term drops substantially upon deletion of these seven autocracies (Table 2, (5) sometimes had an effective legislature. Re-classifying these seven authoritarian regimes as nondemocracies (while retaining the seven poor-data-quality observations identified above) substantially alters the coefficients on 7 Persson and Tabellini cite Banks (1987) and Taylor and Jodice (1983) as their sources for classification of regime types, with no further details. The nearest Taylor and Jodice come to such a classification is a table listing Gastil's ratings of civil liberties and political freedoms for the 1970s. These ratings conform much more closely to my Gurr-based classification than to Persson and Tabellini's, however. Banks does not classify regime types. The recent histories of various countries described therein do not appear to support the Persson-Tabellini classifications --South Korea's entry, for instance, is a long narrative of authoritarianism.
MIDDLE for the two subsamples (compare equations 4 and 5 in Table 1 to equations 1 and 2 respectively). In the combined sample, the coefficient on MIDDLE*DEMOC drops by nearly one-half, and again is no longer significantly different from zero (Table 2, Differences between democracies and nondemocracies in inequality's growth effects disappear entirely when the two corrections are made together, i.e. when regimes are re-classified and the seven suspect observations on MIDDLE are dropped. The coefficients and t-statistics on MIDDLE are nearly identical for the two samples (equations 4 and 6 in Table 1 ). The coefficient of MIDDLE*DEMOC drops precipitously in the interaction specification (Table 2 Numerous other studies (e.g., Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, 1994 ) have used an additive index of Gastil ratings as a measure of democracy.
sample than in their autocracy sample. This result proves to be highly dependent on their use of secondary enrollment --perhaps the most inappropriate possible instrument. Secondary enrollment is strongly correlated with error term of the growth equation, and is in fact a standard regressor in growth equations (e.g., Barro, 1991) . The most widely-cited theory of education's impact on growth does not posit inequality as a channel through which secondary education influences growth (Nelson and Phelps, 1966) . In some theoretical models (e.g., Saint-Paul and Verdier, 1993) , education is even endogenous to inequality.
Despite the elegance of median voter theories, the finding presented here --that inequality's impact on growth does not differ signfiicantly by regime type --is likely to surprise few observers of world politics. Even where autocrats or bureaucrats, rather than elected representatives, choose tax policies, their choices can be influenced by the need to maintain popular support, or at least acquiescence. Additionally, even where leaders' choice of taxation and redistribution policies are not highly sensitive to inequality, growth may be harmed by inequality through increasing political violence. Theories on possible links between inequality and political violence date to Aristotle, and numerous recent empirical studies have addressed these links, albeit not conclusively.
9 Barro (1991) and others have shown that political violence is detrimental to growth. The types of political violence most strongly related to growth --revolutions and coups --are far more common in autocracies than in democracies.
9 See Wang et al. (1993) for a sample of this research.
